Friday, July 06, 2018

Been Down So Long It Looks Like Debt to Me | M.H. Miller

Been Down So Long It Looks Like Debt to Me | M.H. Miller

Been Down So Long It Looks Like Debt to Me | M.H. Miller

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On Halloween in 2008, about six weeks after Lehman Brothers collapsed, my mother called me from Michigan to tell me that my father had lost his job in the sales department of Visteon, an auto parts supplier for Ford. Two months later, my mother lost her own job working for the city of Troy, a suburb about half an hour from Detroit. From there our lives seemed to accelerate, the terrible events compounding fast enough to elude immediate understanding. By June, my parents, unable to find any work in the state where they spent their entire lives, moved to New York, where my sister and I were both in school. A month later, the mortgage on my childhood home went into default for lack of payment.

After several months of unemployment, my mother got a job in New York City fundraising for a children's choir. In the summer of 2010, I completed school at New York University, where I received a B.A. and an M.A. in English literature, with more than $100,000 of debt, for which my father was a cosigner. By this time, my father was still unemployed and my mother had been diagnosed with an aggressive form of breast cancer. She continued working, though her employer was clearly perturbed that she'd have to take off every Friday for chemotherapy. To compensate for the lost time, on Mondays she rode early buses into the city from the Bronx, where, after months of harrowing uncertainty, my parents had settled. She wanted to be in the office first thing.

In January 2011, Chase Bank took full possession of the house in Michigan. Our last ties were severed by an email my father received from the realtor, who had tried and failed to short sell the property, telling him "it's safe to turn off the utilities." In May, I got a freelance contract with a newspaper that within a year would hire me full-time—paying me, after taxes, roughly $900 every two weeks. In September 2011, my parents were approved for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, and in October, due to a paperwork snafu, their car was repossessed in the middle of the night by creditors. Meanwhile, the payments for my debt—which had been borrowed from a variety of federal and private lenders, most prominently Citibank—totaled about $1,100 a month.

Now thirty years old, I have been incapacitated by debt for a decade. The delicate balancing act my family and I perform in order to make a payment each month has become the organizing principle of our lives. To this end, I am just one of about forty-four million borrowers in the United States who owe a total of roughly $1.4 trillion in student loan debt. This number is almost incomprehensibly high, and yet it continues to increase with no sign of stopping. Reform legislation that might help families in financial hardship has failed in Congress. A bill introduced in May 2017, the Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy Act, which would undo changes made to the bankruptcy code in the early 2000s, stalled in committee. Despite all evidence that student loan debt is a national crisis, the majority of the U.S. government—the only party with the power to resolve the problem—refuses to acknowledge its severity.

The delicate balancing act my family and I perform in order to make a payment each month has become the organizing principle of our lives.

My debt was the result, in equal measure, of a chain of rotten luck and a system that is an abject failure by design. My parents never lived extravagantly. In the first years of their marriage, my father drove a cab. When they had children and my father started a career in the auto industry, we became firmly middle class, never wanting for anything, even taking vacations once a year to places like Myrtle Beach or Miami. Still, there was usually just enough money to cover the bills—car leases, a mortgage, groceries. My sister and I both attended public school. How much things cost was a constant discussion. Freshman year of high school, when I lost my yearbook, which cost $40, my mother very nearly wept. College, which cost roughly $50,000 a year, was the only time that money did not seem to matter. "We'll find a way to pay for it," my parents said repeatedly, and if we couldn't pay for it immediately, there was always a bank somewhere willing to give us a loan. This was true even after my parents had both lost their jobs amidst a global financial meltdown. Like many well-meaning but misguided baby boomers, neither of my parents received an elite education but they nevertheless believed that an expensive school was not a materialistic waste of money; it was the key to a better life than the one they had. They continued to put faith in this falsehood even after a previously unimaginable financial loss, and so we continued spending money that we didn't have—money that banks kept giving to us.

I've spent a great deal of time in the last decade shifting the blame for my debt. Whose fault was it? My devoted parents, for encouraging me to attend a school they couldn't afford? The banks, which should have never lent money to people who clearly couldn't pay it back to begin with, continuously exploiting the hope of families like mine, and quick to exploit us further once that hope disappeared? Or was it my fault for not having the foresight to realize it was a mistake to spend roughly $200,000 on a school where, in order to get my degree, I kept a journal about reading Virginia Woolf? (Sample passage, which assuredly blew my mind at the time: "We are interested in facts because we are interested in myth. We are interested in myth insofar as myth constructs facts.") The problem, I think, runs deeper than blame. The foundational myth of an entire generation of Americans was the false promise that education was priceless—that its value was above or beyond its cost. College was not a right or a privilege but an inevitability on the way to a meaningful adulthood. What an irony that the decisions I made about college when I was seventeen have derailed such a goal.

Letter to an Unknown Lender

After the dust settled on the collapse of the economy, on my family's lives, we found ourselves in an impossible situation: we owed more each month than we could collectively pay. And so we wrote letters to Citibank's mysterious P.O. Box address in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, begging for help, letters that I doubt ever met a human being. We grew to accept Citibank as a detestable Moloch that we feared and hated but were made to worship. The letters began to comprise a diary for my father in particular, a way to communicate a private anguish that he mostly bottled up, as if he was storing it for later. In one letter, addressed "Dear Citi," he pleaded for a longer-term plan with lower monthly payments. He described how my mother's mounting medical bills, as well as Chase Bank's collection on our foreclosed home, had forced the family into bankruptcy, which provided no protection in the case of private student loans. We were not asking, in the end, for relief or forgiveness, but merely to pay them an amount we could still barely afford. "This is an appeal to Citi asking you to work with us on this loan," he wrote to no one at all.

Finally, at the beginning of 2012, my father started writing to the office of Congressman Joseph Crowley, who represented the district in the Bronx where my parents had relocated. In one of these letters, he described watching Too Big to Fail, an HBO film about the financial crisis, which had come out several months earlier. (My parents lost every asset they had, but they still subscribed to HBO, which became more than TV for them, a symbolic relic of their former class status.) The recession was over, officially anyway, and people who had not suffered its agonies were already profiting from its memory. Recession films often took place in the gleaming offices of hedge funds and investment banks, with attractive celebrities offering sympathetic portrayals of economists and bankers—Zachary Quinto, in 2011's Margin Call, for instance, plays a rocket scientist-turned-risk analyst with a heart of gold, a do-gooder who discovers that his employer has leveraged itself to the edge of bankruptcy. The stars of these films depicted figures who experienced little to no repercussions for their roles in leading the country into a recession, who abused the misfortune of people like my parents—unmentionables who owed more on their houses than what they had paid for them and, of course, who were rarely visited in any of these films. My father described himself and my mother to Crowley as "the poster children for this entire financial event," by which he meant Americans who seemed to have done everything right on paper, but in doing so contributed to their own downfall. By the time he wrote to Crowley, my father was working again, but it had taken him two years to find another job for much less money. After his run of financial calamity, he knew better than to believe anything good would last. "We are in our sixties and I figure when we get to our mid-seventies life will become difficult again," he wrote.

Crowley's office wrote back. It was the first time in about two years that a person had responded to our correspondence with encouragement, or something like it. Kevin Casey, who worked for Crowley in Washington, helped arrange a conference call with government liaisons from Citigroup to discuss a different payment plan. The current monthly payments to Citi were for more than $800 a month, and we were trying to talk them into letting us pay the loan over a longer period, at a rate of about $400 a month. These terms were reasonable enough, but the response to this request was like an automated message brought to life: "We are precluded from a regulatory perspective from being able to do what you are asking," each of the representatives said. What made these exchanges more ridiculous was the fact that Citibank was in the process of retreating from the student loan market by selling off my debt to Discover Financial, who would give us the same response. We were nothing to these companies but a number in a database. And they fully controlled our fates.

The Unsweetened Release

I used to wonder if the people who worked for these lenders had families of their own, and if they would ever find themselves bankrupt, wondering where they were going to live. Most of all, I wondered what they would do if their own children had to take out loans to pay for college. After ten years of living with the fallout of my own decisions about my education, I have come to think of my debt as like an alcoholic relative from whom I am estranged, but who shows up to ruin happy occasions. But when I first got out of school and the reality of how much money I owed finally struck me, the debt was more of a constant and explicit preoccupation, a matter of life and death.

I had studied English because I wanted to be a writer. I never had an expectation of becoming rich. I didn't care about money. My M.A. fed an intellectual curiosity that eventually led me to newspapers, and I don't regret that my translation of "The Dream of the Rood" from Old English to contemporary vernacular was not a terribly marketable or even applicable skill. I understand now the extent to which I was among the most overeducated group of young adults in human history. Still, following completion of this degree, I enrolled in night school because the cost of a French class at New York's Cooper Union, an action that deferred my having to start paying off the debt, was cheaper than making the monthly payments I owed. Once I could no longer delay and the payments began, a question echoed through my head from the moment the day began, and often jolted me awake at night. I would look at the number on my paycheck and obsessively subtract my rent, the cost of a carton of eggs and a can of beans (my sustenance during the first lean year of this mess), and the price of a loan payment. The question was: What will you do when the money from the paycheck is gone?

I never arrived at an answer to this question. At my lowest points, I began fantasizing about dying, not because I was suicidal, but because death would have meant relief from having to come up with an answer. My life, I felt, had been assigned a monetary value—I knew what I was worth, and I couldn't afford it, so all the better to cash out early. The debt was mind-controlling—how I would eat or pay my rent without defaulting was a constant refrain, and I had long since abandoned any hope for a future in which I had a meaningful line of credit or a disposable income or even simply owned something—but also mind-numbingly banal. I spent a great deal of time filling out paperwork over and over again with my personal information and waiting on hold for extended periods in order to speak to a robotic voice rejecting my request. It didn't matter what the request was or who I was asking. It was always rejected.

"Listen, it's just debt," he said. "No one is dying from this."

And so it felt good to think about dying, in the way that it felt good to take a long nap in order to not be conscious for a while. These thoughts culminated in November 2010, when I met with my father one afternoon at a diner in Brooklyn to retrieve more paperwork. My hope for some forgiving demise had resulted in my being viciously sick for about ten days with what turned out to be strep throat. I refused to go to the doctor in the hope that my condition might worsen into a more serious infection that, even if it didn't kill me, might force someone to at last lavish me with pity. I coughed up a not insignificant portion of yellowish fluid before my father and I entered the restaurant. We sat at a table, and I frowned at the forms he handed me. I started the conversation by asking, "Theoretically, if I were to, say, kill myself, what would happen to the debt?"

"I would have to pay it myself," my father said, in the same tone he would use a few minutes later to order eggs. He paused and then offered me a melancholy smile, which I sensed had caused him great strain. "Listen, it's just debt," he said. "No one is dying from this."

My father had suffered in the previous two years. In a matter of months, he had lost everything he had worked most of his adult life to achieve—first his career, then his home, then his dignity. He had become a sixty-year-old man who had quite reluctantly shaved his graying forty-year-old mustache in order to look younger, shuffling between failed job interviews where he was often told he had "too much experience." He was ultimately forced out of the life he'd known, dragging with him, like some twenty-first-century Pa Joad, a U-Haul trailer crammed with family possessions, including, at the insistence of my mother, large plastic tubs of my childhood action figures.

Throughout this misery my father had reacted with what I suddenly realized was stoicism, but which I had long mistaken for indifference. This misunderstanding was due in part to my mother, whom my father mercifully hadn't lost, and who had suffered perhaps most of all. Not that it was a competition, but if it were, I think she would have taken some small amount of satisfaction in winning it. The loss of home and finances felt at least like a worthy opponent for cancer, and yet here was my father telling me that none of this was the end of the world. I felt a flood of sympathy for him. I was ashamed of my selfishness. The lump in my throat began to feel less infectious than lachrymal. "Okay," I said to him, and that was that. When I got home I scheduled an appointment with a doctor.

Social Finance Disorder

Much of the dilemma about being in debt came down to numbers that I could only comprehend in the abstract. $38,840 at 2.25 percent interest and a notice that in May 2016 the interest would increase to 2.5 percent. A $25,000 loan at 7.5 percent interest, to which my family and I had contributed, over the course of three years, $12,531.12 and on which I now owed $25,933.66. More than what I started out with. I memorized—or, more often, didn't—seemingly crucial details about my debt that turned out to be comically meaningless: a low interest loan from Perkins was serviced by a company called ACS, which had rebranded to Conduent Education and sent out notices with their new logo and the message "Soon to be Conduent." Citibank, referring to itself as "Citibank, N.A. (Citibank)," transferred the servicing of my loans to Firstmark, and I had to create an account with Firstmark. Sallie Mae's lending arm spun off into an independent company called Navient, which became the country's largest supplier of private student loans, and eventually sold a portion of my debt to a lender called Great Lakes. In 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau sued Navient for deliberately creating problems for borrowers trying to pay off a loan by supplying them with faulty information—for instance, according to the litigation, encouraging borrowers to enter payment plans that temporarily postponed bills instead of enrolling them in repayment plans that promised forgiveness after years of steady payment. This lawsuit seemed bathed in significance, but of course resulted in nothing at all, save for a widely circulated public statement from Navient claiming, "There is no expectation that the servicer will act in the interest of the consumer." When I received a notice from Navient in February 2017 that my monthly payments would be increasing, for reasons I did not comprehend, the email came with a note at the bottom saying, "We're here to help: We're happy to help you navigate your options, provide you with resources, and answer any questions you have as you repay your loans." The company's motto is, hilariously, "Solutions for your success."

These announcements flooded my inbox with the subject line "Important Information," but none of them altered my fate. Sometimes the the monthly payments would go up, sometimes my salary would go up, sometimes I made a check out to a different company. The only stable thing was the money I owed, which never seemed to get any lower. And so the cash would go out to the various lenders with the blind hope that it was the right amount and going to the correct place and, on top of everything, a dreadful anticipation that any day now I would hear from the credit bureau and my life would somehow bottom out. In some twisted way, I wanted it to happen. My mother's cancer went into remission and both of my parents found, in their sixties, new careers in New York. I maintained steady employment in journalism since finishing school, and in 2016 I was hired as an editor at the New York Times. Was it possible we had become lucky? I had spent so much time wondering what life's nadir looked like that I was now curious whether it had already come and gone.

In a matter of months, my father had lost everything he had worked most of his adult life to achieve—first his career, then his home, then his dignity.

It was in the summer of 2017, after my father, now nearing seventy, had lost another job, the prediction he made to Crowley about life getting difficult again coming a little earlier than expected, that I finally removed him as a cosigner and refinanced my loans with one of the few companies that provides such a service, SoFi. My wife, who agreed to marry me last fall, would help with the payments when she could. Sharing the burden of my debt with my spouse instead of my parents was a small, depressing victory, a milestone perhaps unique to members of my generation, one that must have carried a similar significance that purchasing a home and having a mortgage had to my parents.

SoFi has not made my situation much more tenable, necessarily. The main difference is that I now write one check instead of several and I have an end date for when the debt, including the calculated interest—about $182,000—will be paid off: 2032, when I'll be forty-four, a number that feels only slightly less theoretical to me than thirty did when I was seventeen. What I have to pay each month is still, for the most part, more than I am able to afford, and it has kept me in a state of perpetual childishness. I rely on the help of people I love and live by each paycheck. I still harbor anxiety about the bad things that could befall me should the paycheck disappear.

But the so-called Important Information I receive has changed. SoFi, which bills itself as a "modern finance company" (its name is shorthand for Social Finance, Inc.), is a Silicon Valley start-up that offers, in addition to loans, membership outreach in the form of financial literacy workshops and free dinners. Their aim is to "empower our members," a mission that was called into question by the resignation, in September 2017, of its CEO, Mike Cagney, who employees allege had engaged in serial workplace sexual harassment and who ran the office, according to a New York Times headline, like "a frat house." (The allegations, according to a report in the Times, include Cagney exchanging explicit text messages with employees, bragging about the size of his genitalia, and the company's chief financial officer offering bonuses to female employees if they lost weight. In January, SoFi hired Anthony Noto, formerly of Twitter, as Cagney's replacement. SoFi has also received criticism for its elitism, for lending only to wealthy, high-earning borrowers, to which I can only say this is a category I do not personally identify with, especially after writing the check to SoFi each month.) The news of Cagney came out not long after I refinanced my loans with the company—I became, I suppose, a SoFi'er, in the company's parlance. Around this same time, I started receiving curious emails from them: "You're Invited: 2 NYC Singles Events" or "Come Celebrate Pride with us!" "Dear NYC SoFi'er," one of these emails read, "Grab a single friend and join us for a fun night at Rare View Rooftop Bar and Lounge in Murray Hill! You'll mingle with some of our most interesting (and available!) members . . ." The invitation cited a statistic that promised "86 percent of members at other SoFi Singles events said they met someone they want to see again."

I will reiterate that I am a thirty-year-old married man with more than $100,000 of debt, who makes less each year than what he owes. Buying a pair of pants is a major financial decision for me. I do not think myself eligible in any sense of the word, nor do I find my debt to be amusing merely on a conversational level. Still, I felt as if in ten years, the debt hadn't changed, but the world had, or at least the world's view of it. This thing, this twenty-first-century blight that had been the source of great ruin and sadness for my family was now so normal—so basic—that it had been co-opted by the wellness industry of Silicon Valley. My debt was now approachable, a way to meet people. It was, in other words, an investment in my future, which is why I had gone into debt in the first place. Would SoFi be this friendly if I lost my job and missed a monthly payment?

Bone Dry and Broken

Let's say I was morbidly intrigued. The day after Valentine's Day, I went to a Mexican restaurant in the financial district for a SoFi community dinner—this was not a single's event, but simply a free meal. There had been another of these dinners nearby my apartment the week before, but it had, to my surprise, quickly sold out. The Mexican restaurant was packed with an after-work crowd in business attire, and SoFi had rented out the back room, where a few dozen people had gathered, all wearing name tags and discussing financial woes. Sid, a software developer from Queens who had racked up credit card debt after college, told me that the debt was a unifying force at these gatherings. "When there's a break in the conversation, someone can just say, 'So, debt, huh?' and things will get going again," he said. "If we walked outside of this room," he continued, gesturing to the suits by the bar, "everyone out there would have debt, too. It's just a little more out in the open for us."

Despite the name tags, the dinner turned out to resemble something more like an AA meeting, an earnest session of group therapy.

Despite the name tags, the dinner turned out to resemble something more like an AA meeting, an earnest session of group therapy. Everyone had their story about the problems caused by their student loans and how they were trying, one day at a time, to improve things, and no story was exceptional, including my own. Ian, an employee for Google who had recently successfully paid off his debt from a Columbia MBA program, became something like my sponsor for the evening. He said he had a few "bone dry" years, where he lived on Instant Noodles. I told him I had a long way to go. "At least you're doing something about it," he said, sincerely.

We sat down to dinner. Across from me was Mira, a defense attorney from Brooklyn, who attended law school at Stanford. Her payments amount to $2,300 a month, more than double my own. When I asked her why she came to this event, she glanced at me as if the answer should have been obvious: she went to law school at Stanford and her payments are $2,300 a month. The table, myself included, looked on her with an odd reverence. She wore a business suit and had her hair pulled back, but I saw her as something like the sage and weathered biker of the group, holding her twenty-year chip, talking in her wisdom about accepting the things you cannot change.

After the food was served, a waiter came by with a stack of to-go boxes, which sat on the edge of the table untouched for a while as everyone cautiously eyed them. The group was reluctant at first, but then Ian said, "The chicken was actually pretty good," as he scooped it into one of the boxes. Mira shrugged, took a fork, and added, "This is a little tacky, but I'd hate to waste free food," and the rest of the table followed her lead. Maybe the next generation would do better, but I felt like we were broke and broken. No number of degrees or professional successes would put us back together again. For now, though, we knew where our next meal was coming from.

M.H. Miller is the arts editor for The New York Times Style Magazine.


_- Steve

The Breakthrough Institute - With the Grain

The Breakthrough Institute - With the Grain

With the Grain

Against the New Paleo Politics

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rains are under growing attack. A whole genre of diet advice blames them for contemporary health problems, described as diseases of civilization. Humans did not evolve to eat "carbs," it is said, which are fit only for peasants.1 Real men, and women too, are better off with meat, nuts, and fruits. Taking this counsel to heart, many of the 45 million Americans (almost one in six) on a diet have chosen a Paleolithic or ketogenic regimen. Many more shun wheat and barley, even though they do not suffer from celiac disease, crediting claims that these grains are silent killers of body and brain.2 Those who do enjoy grains are apt to dismiss their modern forms, seeking out ancient and supposedly healthier versions. Grains and soy, rail political activists such as Miguel Altieri, have replaced traditional multi-cropping with monocultures that deprive peasants of a life on the land.3 The crops produced by "big ag" are "not food but commodities, grain not to eat but to store, trade, and process," environmentalist Richard Manning charges in his 2004 book Against the Grain.4 Environmentalists fret further about fertilizer runoff and pesticide use on these high-yielding crops.

The anti-grain consensus, ostensibly focused on the improvement of diet, equality, and environment, rejects in theory if not in practice the very notions of progress and civilization. That the turn to grain-based agriculture transformed the healthful, leisured, and carefree life enjoyed by hunter-gatherers into the dull drudgery of peasant society is a theme promulgated by prominent scholars, notably the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins, who termed hunter-gatherers "the original affluent society," and the biologist Jared Diamond, who declared agriculture "the worst mistake in the history of the human race."5 The historian Yuval Noah Harari takes a similar tack in his bestselling Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (2015). Underlying each of these criticisms is a rejection of the old idea, implicit in the foundational myths of the first civilizations and explicit in Enlightenment conjectural histories, that the postulated passage through the stages of hunting and gathering, herding, and farming constituted progress: an improvement in the quality of human life.

In 2017, James C. Scott, the Sterling Professor of Political Science at Yale University, joined the anti-grain chorus with his widely praised Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States.6 Scott's is a name to conjure with. His pioneering field work on the resistance of Southeast Asian peasant societies to state power was followed by widely read articles and books, particularly Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1998), that spread his reputation from the halls of political science departments to the wider public.7

There is much to agree with in Against the Grain, not least because Scott, by his own admission, is reporting what archaeologists and historians have learned over the past century. Material familiar even to high school students following the Advanced Placement world history syllabus came as news to him, he says, just a few years ago.8 Domestication was not a sudden event but a long, drawn-out process in which humans successively mastered fire, the breeding of certain animals, and the use of grains, well before the emergence of farming or cities. Only grains — easy to monitor, count, carry away, store, and redistribute in measured amounts — could support cities.9 Non-state societies (hunters and gatherers, nomads, and those who gardened roots) did not constitute stages prior to civilization but coexisted with "civilizations" (grain-based states), dwindling to almost nothing in size and influence only in the last few hundred years. Living in the early states meant drudgery, taxation, slavery, and ill health for much of the population.

These facts, Scott concludes, leave the "progress narrative" that celebrates settled life, farming, cities, and states in "tatters." Dismissing the main historical trajectory of the past 5,000 years, city-based societies, and the grains on which they have depended for most of their calories and nutrients is no small matter. It's also one in which I have a personal stake, as I reviewed the same facts in my Cuisine and Empire: Cooking in World History (2013) and drew very different conclusions. In that book (which might have been called Grains and Progress), I argued that without grains, no progress in the human condition would have been possible.

Food systems — the ways our food is acquired, prepared, and distributed — are interwoven with politics — the power structures of societies. The two change in tandem. Over the course of human history, the very real costs of grain-based, city-centered, agrarian societies have been offset by the fact that, unlike the foraging, herding, and gardening alternatives, grain-based societies were able, over time, to reduce labor and inequality while increasing access to good food and political participation. This was progress: not the grand narrative of a march forward sure from the first step across the whole of human life, but a specific narrative that acknowledges backward steps and unintended consequences while insisting on overall improvements in the food system and in social and political organization.

1.

Hungry humans thought that cereal grains made great food long before they began farming them. In today's terms, cereals have a high calorie per area yield — in the case of corn, as much as 15 million calories an acre, or enough to sustain 15 people for a year. This yield has been rivaled in the past four hundred years only by potatoes, sugar cane, and rice.10 Even the wild ancestors of cereals were productive, as the American botanist Jack Harlan demonstrated in the 1960s when he ventured into a stand of wild einkorn wheat in Turkey and harvested four pounds in one hour, enough to feed two people for a day. Unlike sugar cane stalks, grains contain a wide range of nutrients, including carbohydrates, fats, proteins, and certain minerals and vitamins. Unlike potatoes, they have a high nutrient-to-weight value. As a rule of thumb, two pounds of grain a day sustain an adult, compared to ten or more pounds of wet, heavy roots, making grain a much better candidate to provision cities. In addition, unlike many roots that contain protective toxins, grains are generally safe to eat. They are also easy to store because they are hard and dry, and, being annuals, can be quickly improved through breeding, planted in response to changing demands, and established in new places. Thus, the contrast between grains as food and grains as commodities is ill-drawn. One reason why grains were good food was precisely that they could be commoditized.

Another reason was that grains could be turned into an amazing variety of tasty, nutritious, useful dishes. To understand why this quality is so important, it's helpful to consider for a moment what human food actually is. For us, unlike for animals, food is not what's gathered or killed or harvested. Plants and carcasses are just the raw materials. Human food is something that humans have to make. At some time in our history, we passed a point of no return: no longer could we flourish eating raw foods.11 We'd lost the claws capable of ripping up carcasses, the teeth capable of chewing raw meat or fibrous plants, and the digestive system that could assimilate flesh and fiber. We now outsourced much of the work our teeth and digestive tract had formerly performed: we processed our food.

Using all the tools — thermal, mechanical, chemical, biochemical, and biological, frequently used sequentially and repetitively — at our disposal, we created food. Stone hammers smashed hard nuts and bones; water and mud removed toxins and leached tannins out of bitter plants; naturally occurring salts preserved flesh; the sweeter fruits and saps turned into delightful intoxicating liquids; flesh could be desiccated and preserved by the sun; ice kept meat good over the winter; and the heat of the fire made flesh both tender and tasty.

Plants and carcasses could be turned into food, then, but it took so much effort that the results had to be worthwhile. Leaves, shoots (vegetables), tough stems, and bitter fruits rarely passed that test. Nuts, roots, and flesh were more promising if they could be cracked, detoxified and softened, and tenderized, respectively.12 By the late Paleolithic, humans had learned to prepare meat and roots in earth ovens and to grate and soak roots to extract the starch.13

The Paleolithic diet, in short, was constantly evolving and at no point more "natural" than at any other. Nor did some primitive egalitarianism reign. Processing, which required as much or more energy than gathering (and, later, farming), built inequality into the human food system long before grains entered the diet. Those who collected the wood, dug the pits, and cracked the nuts lost. The group as a whole benefitted, the way now being open to more-complex societies and economies.

When humans did turn to cereal grains about 20,000 years ago, they embarked on a long series of breakthroughs that transmuted these grass seeds into a greater array of appealing, sustaining, nutritious foodstuffs than was possible from any other part of any other kind of plant. Most of these foodstuffs are still prepared somewhere in the world today. Sprouted grains and unripe corn are light and tasty. Toasted ground grains, such as pinole made from maize or the mixed-grain gofio of the Canary Islands, are instant foods to be eaten as is or mixed with hot water. Parboiled dried grains, such as bulgur or rice, are also fast foods. Smashed grains and water make porridge or, with added vegetables, legumes, and meat, the pottage that sustained much of humanity. Softer grains, such as rice or millets, taste good simply boiled. Flour from harder grains and water can be shaped into tender noodles or satisfying dumplings (tamales), or baked or steamed to make a fragrant flatbread. Salted, moldy grains or bread make tasty condiments. Chewed maize or sprouted barley grains and molded rice ferment to thick, heady, filling beers. The sweetener malt sugar can also be extracted from sprouted barley. The debate about whether it was to ensure their supply of bread or beer that people turned to farming misses the point: grains were worth farming precisely because they could be turned both into bread and into beer, and into many other foods as well.14

Grain foods offered a variety of delicious tastes and textures for different purposes. They made shelf-stable provision for travelers, portable food for field and construction workers, stretchable porridges and pottages for hungry families, beer for energy and cheer, pap for babies and grandmothers, white breads and rice for rulers, and brown for their subjects. Add a few legumes, oil from oil seeds, and foraged greens, and diets were complete, varied, and satisfying. Hence, wherever cereal grains could be gathered from the wild, people added them to their diet: in the Yellow River and Yangtze valleys, the Fertile Crescent, the Sahel, and Mexico. Many remain valuable — particularly wheat, rice, and maize, and to a lesser extent barley, oats, millets, and sorghum — while others, such as Job's tears and hemp, are no longer on the table.15  

Absent their benefits, humans would never have persisted with grains, given their appalling costs. The energy required for their processing came not from fire but from human effort. Twenty repetitive steps of threshing, winnowing, and cleaning were required just to rid barley and wheat of their husks.16 Most cereals had to be ground because whole grains remained chewy even when boiled. Grinding enough with a saddle stone to provide one adult with bread for one day took an hour, so where bread was the staple, one out of five adults spent their lives grinding for themselves and others. "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread," said the Old Testament, and sweat it was, a job forced on women and slaves, the lowliest in society. The social differences already inherent to eating processed plants and animals were only amplified by the shift to grains. Archaeologists have found that among modern women, only elite competition rowers who train 21 hours a week rival the upper body strength of prehistoric Central European women. 

Yet cereal grains were so valuable that by 2000 BC, humans had transported them across continents and oceans, acclimatized them to new soils and climates, and scaled up production to feed whole populations. Wheat and barley from West Asia had been established in northern China, India, North Africa, and Europe. Chinese and Indian rice had hybridized. Indians had adopted African millets, and Africans Indian ones. Maize had spread south to the Andes and north to the central highlands of Mexico. Knowingly or not, humans selected for larger seeds, seeds that ripened simultaneously, and seeds that were easier to thresh. No longer were cereals gathered; they were farmed.

2.

The costs of farming, to which Scott constantly refers, are well known: the effort of preparing the land, the labor of irrigating it in dry areas, the back-breaking work of weeding, and the exhausting toil of harvesting the crops. What he does not recognize is that the forced labor of grinding, a daily rather than seasonal task, was worse. Although the work varied somewhat from grain to grain, preparing flour for, say, barley or wheat bread took by my reckoning one in five working adults — 20 percent of the working population condemned to grinding five hours a day, day in, day out, in every ancient society in the barley-wheat regions that stretched from northern China through northern India to northwest Europe. Every palace had its grinding slaves. And every civilization depended on those who stood to pound and knelt to grind, a fact that might have strengthened Scott's case, had he acknowledged it.

Over the centuries, though, human drudgery was reduced by innovations in processing and farming even as the variety of foods made from grains continued to grow. To attempt to give a sense of the scale of the change, the proportion of the population required to grind the harder grains such as wheat, barley, or maize fell from around 1 in 5 with the saddle stone to between 1 in 10 and 1 in 20 with the rotary quern, and then again to between 1 in 100 and 1 in 1,000 with water mills. After 1900, with the adoption of fossil fuel–powered roller mills, the proportion grinding wheat was too small to be recorded. Fossil fuel–powered rice mills quickly followed, transforming the lives of millions of women. In the mid-20th century, mills for wet-grinding maize freed Mexican women from toil (and made it possible to extract oil from corn). Only in the poorest parts of the world did women still pound and grind.

By the end of the 20th century, in addition to the earlier foods, wheat had been turned into raised bread; flat breads, pasta, dumplings, and umami-rich condiments; gluten (seitan) used as a mock meat; pie crusts and pretzels; machine-made, shelf-stable crackers; cookies, quick breads, pancakes, and cakes; and shelf-stable, ready-to-eat white bread and pasta (pot noodles). Rice was parboiled, ground, popped, flaked, and fermented. Maize treated with alkali made flexible tortillas, and fermented, as it later was in West Africa, a tasty dough (kenkey); alcohol; vegetable oil; high-fructose corn syrup; and, fed to livestock, beef, pork, and chicken.

Meeting the intellectual and technological challenges of turning grains into food came with wider benefits as well. From pestles, mortars, and grindstones to mills, food processing tools and techniques could be taken up by other industries and transferred to other activities. Flow-through technology, for instance, was pioneered in gristmills. Because of their technical skills, millers played a disproportionate role in the industrialization of Britain and the United States. Containers and packaging — including pottery, sacks, and granaries — proved similarly important. The field of organic chemistry began with the analysis of sugars, fats, and starches.

Agricultural yields also reached new heights. The productivity of farming had increased at important junctures throughout human history: when high-yielding rice from Southeast Asia was introduced to China in the 11th century, for example, or when improved farming practices were introduced in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. In the 20th century, machines, new higher-yielding crop varieties, and fertilizer — particularly synthetic nitrogen compounds from the Haber process — made yields soar.

This is not to say that there were no rocky patches in this overall pattern of improvement. The acreage devoted to grains kept creeping up at the expense of wood and grassland, although thanks to increasing productivity, it did not grow as fast as population. Between the end of the 18th century and 1990, the latter more than quintupled from 1 billion to 5.3 billion, while cropland, mainly for grains, grew from 3–5 percent of the world's land to around 11 percent.17 Seasonal hunger and periodic famine remained endemic problems, the latter never more so than with the surge in population in the 18th and 19th centuries, a challenge failed by states of every political persuasion, whether in Ireland, the Ukraine, Bengal, or China.

Even so, the logistics of feeding growing numbers improved as steam, then diesel, then containerization lengthened the grain chain, linking the huge silos on what had been the world's grasslands in the United States, Canada, and Argentina to the elevators in London and Liverpool, Mexico City, Yokohama, and Cairo. Famines declined. Cities of 20 million could be provisioned by a small number of farmers and processors, leaving the majority free to engage in a vast range of other activities, something that would have been impossible without grains. It's something of an irony, then, that Scott and others of his persuasion — who can explore non-state societies, write books, and teach at universities because neither they nor the university bureaucrats, airline pilots, students, or book publishers who support their work have to spend their time provisioning — should argue against the grains. 

3.

How did hungry, grain-eating humans see the food and politics of the groups that Scott vaunts — hunter-gatherers, pastoralists, and gardeners? He refrains from asking the question, perhaps because archaeologists and anthropologists less starry-eyed than Sahlins and his admirers have reported that one group after another suffered high death rates, in part due to warfare, harsh disparities of rank and gender, and restricted, inadequate diets — features that Scott attributes to early states.18 The !Kung (Bushmen) of southern Africa, for example, who inspired Sahlins to coin the phrase "the original affluent society," lived largely on the flesh and kernels of mongongo nuts, augmented with some bush meat. To enjoy this bounty, they spent a mere three days a week gathering food; the rest of the time they could do whatever they cared, or so claimed the anthropologist Richard B. Lee.19 Sadly, this finding has not been borne out. Lee's account failed to include food processing in his calculation of food procurement: factor in time spent walking from tree to tree, lugging the nuts back to camp, heating them to soften the tough shells, cracking them, and winkling out their little kernels, and the !Kung had as long a work week as any modern wage-earner, a point Lee himself subsequently conceded. Worse, in years of drought, the supply of mongongo nuts dwindled and the !Kung suffered severe weight loss, malnutrition, and even death.20

The Comanche of the American southwest, one of many nomad groups Scott admires because they "fought against permanent settlement," depended on bison meat. Their diet was rich and meaty but perilously low in carbohydrates. To supplement the meat, the Comanche, like other nomads, had to locate some supply of starches, either by digging roots out of the hard, arid soil or by trading horses for corn.21 For the arduous digging, processing, and other chores, the Comanche enslaved other Native Americans, African Americans, and people of European ancestry. Even so, they were ravaged by epidemics, and in the second half of the 19th century the Comanche population collapsed with the decimation of the bison.

Native Hawaiians, living on Pacific islands often described as bountiful, depended chiefly on poi (cooked, pounded taro root).22 In fact, the islands that the Hawaiians found when they first landed were a food desert, featuring only flightless birds (gone in a generation or two), fish, and seaweed. It was the dozen or so edible plants that the Hawaiians brought with them in their catamarans that allowed them to survive: they grew taro in laboriously constructed paddies, working up to their waists in muddy water, and cooked it for hours in underground ovens to remove toxins. A system of taboos (kapu) governed eating, among many other aspects of society. If broken, by women daring to eat with men, for example, or to enjoy pork or the better fish, the penalty was summary execution.

The people who dwelt in the marshes of southern Mesopotamia shortly before farming and cities arose — Scott's favorite example — took fish, turtles, and crustaceans from the waters, hunted migrating deer and water birds, and harvested the roots of aquatic plants such as club-rushes, cattails, water lilies, and bulrushes: a "cornucopia," says Scott.23 Whether this biodiversity translated into a plentiful, diverse diet for hungry humans is another matter. How was the seasonal glut of deer and birds preserved for the lean season? What did they eat when it turned cold and the turtles burrowed into the mud? Who waded into the water to harvest the roots, then peeled, grated, and soaked or ground them to make flour? What happened when the rushes were wet and did not light easily for cooking?

Four groups are not proof but they are suggestive. In none was the diet more varied and nutritious than in agrarian societies, nor could political or social life have been preferable. And was life for farmers truly as dreary a contrast to the supposed fun of hunting and gathering as it's made out to be? If on the farm I grew up on in England in the second half of the 20th century we hunted hare and birds, gathered hazelnuts and blackberries, herded cattle, and grew fruit and vegetables, would not farmers in Mesopotamia have caught birds in nets, fished in irrigation canals, and picked wild greens from the edges of the fields?

4.

Hungry humans knew as well as Scott that early states could be bad news, with their forced extraction of tax or tribute and their rigid hierarchies, both linked to grains. "The power to feed fed power," observes a historian of the Ottoman Empire — a truth that all rulers had to keep constantly in mind.24 The monarchs depended on the court and army. Prior to money, and persisting long after it, they were paid in kind with food. Palaces and temples housed capacious granaries to hold taxes and tribute. Their kitchens, where dozens, hundreds, or even thousands labored, fed the royal family, their courts, their artisans, and their bodyguards, who, freed from producing and processing food, specialized in crafts, combat, or mental work. Furthermore, hierarchy was reflected and reinforced by what you ate. Those who labored ate coarse porridges and dark breads. Those who ruled dined on fine white bread or rice, thought to be far more nutritious and fortifying.

Rulers' power, however, was not absolute, not simply because, as Scott says, the early states were precarious, but also because of a widely understood contract between rulers and subjects about food security and food and citizenship. Rulers were expected to guarantee food for their subjects. To do this, they waged war for land, labor, and booty, and they bargained with the gods through sacrifices of grains and meat. By feeding the gods (such as Lord Millet in China, or Demeter in Greece) who were believed to have given humans the gift of grains, they expected in return success in war and bountiful harvests. A failed harvest was a failed sacrifice and sanctioned resistance to the state.

Over millennia, the techniques used to ensure the grain supply shifted from sacrifice to state-sponsored religions promising bread and salvation to secular measures. States built granaries for the court but also to store grains to hand out as a last resort when the grain market failed. They passed laws and edicts laying down rations, serving sizes, and penalties for falsifying weights of grain foods. They mandated the planting of higher-yielding grains, the restriction of grain exports, and the policing of millers and bakers. Politicians debated the Corn Laws and free trade. Economists pondered rent and futures markets. By the end of the 20th century, many states entrusted corporations such as General Mills and ConAgra in the United States, Rank in Britain, Nippon in Japan, and Rong in China with milling, and privately owned companies such as Bunge, Cargill, and Dreyfus with much of the grain supply. The state's interest as guarantor of last resort had expanded from court, to city-state, to nation, to much of the world by the time Herbert Hoover introduced international food aid with wheat shipments to starving Belgium following World War I. Mechanisms had changed, but the power to feed continued to feed power — to be used for political ends. While attributed to Socrates, it was the United States Department of Agriculture that coined the slogan "No man can be called a statesman who is ignorant of problems of wheat." As the techniques for assuring the grain supply changed, so did the framework for political unrest if it failed, evolving from the sacrificial bargain to the "moral economy."25 Whether it was Parisian women marching on Versailles demanding bread in 1789, protesters clamoring for bread in Russia in 1917, or Egyptian bread riots in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the rhetoric of food shortage accompanied political resistance.

Just as grain-supported state power always had its counterbalance, so did grain-underwritten hierarchies. To unite the state, rulers paid for communal feasts where all could consume strengthening, prestigious white bread or rice (and meat). Early on, participating in the feast following the sacrifice and partaking of the finer grains and roast meat offered to the gods was a civic duty. The sacrifice vanished, but public feasts, designed to unite all included in a society, continued well into the 20th century and have their distant echoes in politicians sharing hamburgers (white bread and meat) with their constituents.

Furthermore, if food determined rank, changing food changed rank. Eating fine white bread or rice, believed through the centuries to be the most empowering of foods, made one part of the elite, and in more egalitarian political systems was a sign of citizenship. As late as 1800, white bread was available to only 50 percent of the population in the country of its highest consumption, Great Britain. By 1900, it was the basic food of all British and Americans. Around the world, politicians, nutritionists, home economists, and cookbook authors assumed that the industrialization and expansion of these nations was linked to the consumption of nutritious white bread. Governments and social reformers in Japan, Mexico, Colombia, Italy, India, and elsewhere introduced measures to spur on modernization by feeding their soldiers, children, and even entire populations pasta and white bread.26 Improbably, then, in the two hundred years between 1800 and 2000, when world population soared from one billion to six billion, social and political inequality decreased, as an increasing proportion of this increasing population ate like rulers of old: enjoying white bread, pasta, or white rice, as well as more fat, more sugar, and more meat, most of all three derived from grain. Sliced, packaged bread was baked and sold in Mumbai, in Nigeria, and by the world's largest baker, Bimbo, in Mexico and across the Americas. White bread anchored two of the world's most popular meals, the pizza and the hamburger, the latter often made with grain-fed beef. Wheat pasta, according to Oxfam, was yet more favored, with Bambino spaghetti in India, Pasta Grande spaghetti in Zaire, and supermarket shelves packed with the instant pot noodle worldwide.27

When everybody can eat white bread, pasta, and white rice, how are people to distinguish themselves? In the United States, the answer is all too often to disdain grains and grain agriculture, and to dwell on the downsides of the civilization that they have supported. "So that's us: processed corn, walking," says Michael Pollan, without pausing to consider that what he so quickly dismisses was one of the great triumphs of the last century.28 That refined white flour is not as beneficial in sedentary populations with low-fiber diets as it was in earlier, more active populations with high-fiber diets should not blind us to its role in the global transformation of subjects into citizens.

5.

Presumably, when Scott and others argue that life in grain-based states was a step backward, they do so not to advocate a return to non-agrarian ways but to indicate that states, modern as much as ancient, can be less than benign and wise. The reminder is salutary. Yet even if life in early states were as grim as they claim, it is irrelevant to the role of grains now and in the future. The advantages grains always offered have been enhanced and the costs brought way down. Progress has been made in feeding people, not in one giant step, but in countless small ones that in aggregate have moved us in the right direction. The past can be left behind; it is what happens now that matters. If the anti-grain consensus takes grains off the table as foods for the future, we will be in for disaster.

The energy and excitement around the future of food, now as during the past two centuries when politicians, agronomists, and the public first began worrying about the exploding population, focuses on the fresh and natural: meat, meat substitutes, and fresh vegetables. The richer cities of the world enjoy these indulgences today, but providing them has required a technological miracle.29 Animal life cycles have been reorganized, packaging has been reinvented, and perhaps the most elaborate network humans ever constructed — energy-intensive cold chains — has been put in place.30 I am just one of millions of beneficiaries, and I marvel at how choice in food has proliferated over the past half-century.

Yet important as fresh meat and vegetables are, they remain delicious luxuries that consume space and energy in quantities disproportionate to other foods.31 The demand that they form ever larger parts of our diet is underwritten by an old elite dream, a wistful longing for the supposedly healthy, leisured, egalitarian, and free (or at least carefree) life of the noble savage and the Arcadian shepherd — a dream that says more about dissatisfaction with modern society than about the realities of herding, hunting, and gathering, or any evolutionary need for large quantities of meat and vegetables.

For all the people now in the world and the three billion more still to inhabit it, grains remain the best bet. It's time to resist the deceptive lure of a non-agrarian world in some imagined past or future dreamed up by countless elites. Instead, we might look to the story of humanity's huge strides in using these tiny seeds to create food that sustains the lives of billions of people, that is fairly distributed and freely chosen, and that with its satisfying taste contributes to happiness. If we are to anticipate more progress in the future, it's not against but with the grain that we must work.  

Read more from Breakthrough Journal, No. 9

Featuring pieces by Alan Levinovitz, R. David Simpson,
Mark Sagoff, Fred Block, Julie Guthman,
Brandon Keim, and more.  


[1] S.B. Eaton and M. Konner, "Paleolithic Nutrition: A Consideration of Its Nature and Current Implications," New England Journal of Medicine 312, no. 5 (1985): 283–289; Loren Cordain, The Paleo Diet: Lose Weight and Get Healthy by Eating the Food You Were Designed to Eat (New York: Wiley, 2001).

[2] William Davis, Wheat Belly Total Health: The Ultimate Grain-Free Health and Weight-Loss Life Plan (New York: Rodale Inc., 2014); David Perlmutter, Grain Brain: The Surprising Truth about Wheat, Carbs, and Sugar — Your Brain's Silent Killers. (New York: Little, Brown, 2015).

[3] Miguel A. Altieri, et al., "Agroecologically Efficient Agricultural Systems for Smallholder Farmers: Contributions to Food Sovereignty," Agronomy for Sustainable Development 32, no. 1 (January 2012): 1–13, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13593-011-0065-6.

[4] Richard Manning, Against the Grain: How Agriculture Has Hijacked Civilization (Berkeley, California: North Point Press, 2005), 188.

[5] Marshall David Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (Transaction Publishers, 1974); Jared Diamond, "The Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race," Discover, May 1, 1999, http://discovermagazine.com/1987/may/02-the-worst-mistake-in-the-history-of-the-human-race.

[6] In the Guardian, the eminent archaeologist Barry Cunliffe called it "well founded and highly provocative," in the New Yorker, John Lanchester hailed it as "the case against civilization," and in the London Review of Books, Steven Mithen, another distinguished archaeologist pronounced it "fascinating."

[7] Jennifer Schuessler, "Professor Who Learns from Peasants," New York Times, December 4, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/books/james-c-scott-farmer-and-scholar-of-anarchism.html.

[9] Scott claims priority for the thesis that only grains could support states, dismissing what he claims to be the only possible competitor, Joram Mayshar, et al., Cereals, Appropriability and Hierarchy (Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2015), http://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/842.pdf. This seems extraordinary.

[10] Tamar Haspel, "In Defense of Corn, the World's Most Important Food Crop," Washington Post, July 12, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/in-defense-of-corn-the-worlds-most-important-food-crop/2015/07/12/78d86530-25a8-11e5-b77f-eb13a215f593_story.html.

[11] Richard Wrangham, Catching Fire: How Cooking Made Us Human (New York: Basic Books, 2009), chap. 1.

[12] Rachel Laudan, "Was the Agricultural Revolution a Terrible Mistake? Not If You Take Food Processing into Account," January 21, 2016, http://www.rachellaudan.com/2016/01/was-the-agricultural-revolution-a-terrible-mistake.html; Wiliam Buckner, "Romanticizing the Hunter-Gatherer," Quillette, December 16, 2017, http://quillette.com/2017/12/16/romanticizing-hunter-gatherer/.

[13] LuAnn Wandsnider, "The Roasted and the Boiled: Food Composition and Heat Treatment with Special Emphasis on Pit-Hearth Cooking," Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 16, no. 1 (March 1997): 1–48, https://doi.org/10.1006/jaar.1997.0303.

[14] R. J. Braidwood, et al., "Symposium: Did Man Once Live by Beer Alone?" American Anthropologist 55, no. 4 (1953): 515–526; Solomon H. Katz and Fritz Maytag, "Brewing an Ancient Beer," Archaeology 44, no. 4 (1991): 24–33; Jeff Alworth, "Of Course Beer Came Before Bread," Beervana (blog), April 10, 2017, https://www.beervanablog.com/beervana/2017/4/9/which-came-first-bread-or-beer.

[15] Rachel Laudan, Cuisine and Empire: Cooking in World History (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2013), chap. 1.

[16] G. C. Hillman, "Traditional Husbandry and Processing of Archaic Cereals in Modern Times: Part I, the Glume Wheats," Bulletin on Sumerian Agriculture 1 (1984): 114–152.

[17] John Robert McNeill, Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), 213.

[18] For example, David Kaplan, "The Darker Side of the 'Original Affluent Society,'" Journal of Anthropological Research 56, no. 3 (October 1, 2000): 301–24, https://doi.org/10.1086/jar.56.3.3631086; Buckner, "Romanticizing the Hunter-Gatherer."

[19] Richard Barry Lee and Irven DeVore, Man the Hunter (Transaction Publishers, 1966).

[20] See Laudan, Cuisine and Empire and "Was the Agricultural Revolution a Terrible Mistake?" above.

[21] Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Peter Mitchell, "Going Back to Their Roots: Comanche Trade and Diet Revisited," Ethnohistory 63, no. 2 (April 2016): 237–71, https://doi.org/10.1215/00141801-3455283.

[22] Rachel Laudan, The Food of Paradise Exploring Hawaii's Culinary Heritage (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996).

[23] Jennifer Pournelle, "Marshland of Cities: Deltaic Landscapes and the Evolution of Civilization," (PhD thesis, University of California, San Diego, 2003), 76.

[24] Amy Singer, Constructing Ottoman Beneficence: An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem, SUNY Series in Near Eastern Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 145,155.

[25] E. P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," Past & Present, no. 50 (1971): 76–136.

[26] Laudan, Cuisine and Empire, chap. 7; Helen Zoe Veit, Modern Food, Moral Food: Self-Control, Science, and the Rise of Modern American Eating in the Early Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), chap. 1.

[27] Al Kinley, "Pasta: The World's Favourite Food," Oxfam, June 15, 2011, https://www.oxfam.org.uk/blogs/2011/06/pasta-the-worlds-favourite-food.

[28] Michael Pollan, The Omnivore's Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 23.

[29] Susanne Freidberg, Fresh: A Perishable History (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009).

[30] "Cold Chain," Top Markets Report (US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, 2016), https://www.trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Cold_Chain_Executive_Summary.pdf.

[31] Tamar Haspel, "We Need to Feed a Growing Planet. Vegetables Aren't the Answer," Washington Post, December 15, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/we-need-to-feed-a-growing-planet-vegetables-arent-the-answer/2016/12/15/f0ffeb3e-c177-11e6-8422-eac61c0ef74d_story.html.



_- Steve

Thursday, July 05, 2018

Turkheimer's Projects: Genetics and Human Agency | Cochran on Zimmer, and Correcting an old Misimpression

Turkheimer's Projects: Genetics and Human Agency | Cochran on Zimmer, and Correcting an old Misimpression

05 Jul Cochran on Zimmer, and Correcting an old Misimpression

Greg Cochran has a review of Carl Zimmer's new book in Quillette.  Zimmer's book is long, and (as Cochran notes; I haven't finished it) has a great deal in it, most of which appears to be of little interest to Cochran.  He wants to talk about race, and though he manages to talk around the topic, race and behavior. He gets the issue wrong in an instructive way.

Cochran starts out with a standard discussion of the reality of race, along the typical, "It's a social construction," "No it's biological" axis. None of this matters much for his actual argument, and in fact all concerned appear to agree: groups of people, defined geographically or phenotypically or ancestrally or however you want, differ to one degree or another in their gene frequencies. No one argues with that. Ancestral groups also differ in their proximal or distal evolutionary histories, and although that is an interesting topic for investigation, it is pretty much irrelevant to the conversation at hand, about why groups of people differ right now in their behavioral traits.  Cochran gets it right:

The question is whether two groups are significantly, innately different in body or behavior, not how many genetic differences exist between them. We're not really concerned with the number of genetic differences, but with the consequences of those differences.

He then says something else that I agree with, which in fact I wrote about at length in an earlier blog post. If two groups differ on a single nucleotide (I used trisomy and Down's Syndrome in my example) that has large and invariant consequences for an outcome, it makes perfect sense to say that the two groups are (in Cochran's undefined terms) "significantly, innately" different. Once again, I agree. So, I think, does everyone else, but unfortunately that isn't what we are talking about. None of the individually heritable differences in behavior that are the real topic of interest here are determined by a single nucleotide. If behavior genetics had worked out this way it would be a very different field, and Cochran and his allies would have won the day a long time ago.

Human behavioral differences of the kind we are talking about are radically polygenic, in a way that has so far resisted any kind of mechanistic or deterministic explanation.  There is an even deeper problem, which we can get to by way of Cochran's next topic, which is dog breeds. Comparing groups of humans to breeds of dogs is perhaps the laziest analogy in the history of human behavior genetics. It's what high school kids write me about when they first become interested in the subject.  You could start with the fact that dogs have been systematically selected for physical and behavioral characteristics for many thousands of years; humans have not. That is part of what makes the argument so gross, but it isn't what is most important here. Yes, breeds are groups of dogs that differ in their gene frequencies. But what did Cochran say about that? Let's look at the quote again:

The question is whether two groups are significantly, innately different in body or behavior, not how many genetic differences exist between them. We're not really concerned with the number of genetic differences, but with the consequences of those differences.

So the question is, to what extent is the relationship between human behavioral differences and our genomes like the relationship between dog behavior differences and their genome? The answer is: they aren't alike at all.  It's a funny argument to make, because it involves pointing out a difference between humans and other animals, in a scientific world that for many good reasons emphasizes the similarities.  Humans, of course, are primates with genomes that evolved pretty much the same way as other genomes did. But the relationship between our behavioral differences and our genetic differences is very different.  The behavior of dogs is "significantly, innately" (if not completely) fixed by their genomes. My two golden retrievers love to swim, like all golden retrievers, and they didn't need to be taught. Like many water dogs, they have webbed paws, an actual biological adaptation, a mechanism, for swimming.  My old hound dog wouldn't jump in the water on a bet. That is part of being a dumb dog—they don't make choices about that kind of thing.

This is where the hereditarians appeal to the heritability of human behavior, which is why Cochran trots out Burt and Bouchard. (Zimmer, by the way, is perfectly well aware that human behavioral differences are heritable in the individual statistical sense.) If the heritability of intelligence is .5, doesn't that mean that humans are behaviorally constrained like dogs, just to a lesser extent? No it doesn't, and this is where the difference between big mechanistic single gene effects and complex polygenicity, and the difference between humans and dogs, become so important. The heritability of intelligence shows that within a population of people there is a correlation between how genotypically similar people are and how similar they are in measured intelligence. It tells you nothing about how you get from point A to point B, or the extent to which your polygenic genotype "significantly, innately" constrained your IQ to turn out the way it did. Our recent efforts to analyze the causal processes leading from DNA to human behavioural differences have only served to reinforce how complex and non-deterministic it all is. There is nothing, repeat nothing, like Cochran's single nucleotide underlying human behavioral differences in the normal range. And without even a hint of mechanism, there is simply nothing we can say about whether you would still be smarter than me if some large or small difference in our life circumstances had occurred, heritability be damned.

This isn't mystical special-pleading about the free will of human beings, it's just a fact of complex human development. You can work it out in a different way, playing by the usual heritability rules. Say the heritability of IQ is .5. What does the distribution of differences between identical twins look like? This is a concrete way of estimating the quantity we actually want to know: how much can IQ vary, conditional on a fixed genotype? There are complications, like measurement error which reduces heritability, and restriction of environmental variance and gene-environmental correlation, which inflate heritability—call it a wash. With a heritability of .5, the standard deviation of the non-genetic variance in IQ, the distribution of IQ within identical twin pairs is sqrt(.5*225)=10.58. I generated a normal distribution of twins with that SD and computed the absolute difference between them. Here is what you get.

Very large IQ differences are plausible for IQ with a heritability of .5. We don't really want to know the mean of this distribution (it's just a transformation of the variance), we want the plausible range. The very upper tail would be pairs in which one member got hit on the head by a brick or something, so let's take the 90th percentile as an estimate of things that might plausibly happen in the real world. The 90th percentile is 26 points. A 26 point difference for a heritable trait in people with exactly the same genome. Golden retriever swimming ability isn't going to come out like that. Sure, you could play around with the parameters, but it is almost impossible to get it down to anything resembling the 12-15 point difference that tends to be of interest, and this is between identical twins. Simple take away: human behavior is very malleable conditional on genotype.

Notice that this whole discussion has been about individuals.  What about groups? I agree with Cochran: if someone found a well-understood genetic mechanism that had a deterministic effect on behavior within a close range, some IQ equivalent of webbed paws, and groups turned out to differ in that mechanism, the race-hereditarians would have what they want. But it hasn't turned out that way. What a well-intentioned hereditarian ought to be doing is searching for a mechanism of that kind, and some of them are; more power to them. I don't think they will be successful but I have no fundamental problem with the effort. That's science. What hereditarians shouldn't be doing is trying to twist basic data about polygenic heritability into false intuitions that genetically-based group differences in behavior are somehow inevitable. They aren't. As I have said many times, if different groups of people were genetically "tuned" (Sam Harris' term) to behave in certain ways, wouldn't you think we would have some examples by now? Maybe not for IQ, for which moral-panicking liberals like me are holding back the inevitable progress of science, but for some other polygenic behavioral trait, innocent and uncontroversial? "Oh yes, we know that the Japanese tendency to be introverted is based in their genome, but Latin American love of salsa dancing turns out to be environmental." But there is nothing, not one single thing.  That is because: (a) There is no coherent theory on which to base such distinctions, other than the ever-hopeful appeal to imagined big-gene mechanistic causes, and (b) When an actual human adaptation, with an accompanying mechanism, is actually discovered, it is uncontroversial.

Using the word "moral" in the previous paragraph reminds me to address something I have wanted to write about for a while. Cochran will bring it up if I don't. Ten years ago, I was invited to the Cato blog to write about the genetics of IQ, in response to a target piece by James Flynn. The conversation, as these conversations will, drifted to group differences and I wrote a post about it, echoing many of the ideas I have expressed here. I was discussing the differences between offensive racial stereotypes and scientific hypotheses about groups, and I said:

Why don't we accept racial stereotypes as reasonable hypotheses, okay to consider until they have been scientifically proven false? They are offensive precisely because they violate our intuition about the balance between innateness and self-determination of the moral and cultural qualities of human beings. No reasonable person would be offended by the observation that African people have curlier hair than the Chinese, notwithstanding the possibility of some future environment in which it is no longer true. But we can recognize a contention that Chinese people are genetically predisposed to be better table tennis players than Africans as silly, and the contention that they are smarter than Africans as ugly, because it is a matter of ethical principle that individual and cultural accomplishment is not tied to the genes in the same way as the appearance of our hair.

My phrase about ethical principle in the last sentence has been widely ridiculed by the hereditarians, Cochran in particular. Although in reading the whole piece I think it is fairly obvious what I meant, I won't attribute it to taking me out of context, because I didn't express my point very clearly, making it too easy to suggest that I was arguing that scientists get to make ethical judgements about which findings they do and don't accept. For the record: I don't think that, so the hereditarians can officially stop saying that I do.

What did I mean? I meant– agreeing with Cochran– that our ethical evaluation of human differences depends not on the fact that they are correlated with genes (they are heritable), but instead on HOW they are related to genes.  Characterizing Zimmer's view by way of an argument made by Richard Lewontin, Cochran says,

According to Lewontin, groups we call races only differ in superficial characteristics like "nose, lip and eye shapes, skin color, hair form and quantity" — and height, and disease susceptibility, the immune system, skeleton, fast-twitch muscles, cranial capacity, bone density, alcohol metabolism, fat metabolism, and so on and so on and so on.

Cochran's argument veers off after this but he wants us to think that the Lewontin view is foolish. If groups can differ in those superficial characteristics, why can't they differ in behaviors as well? This is the very core of the hereditarian argument. My answer is above: the problem is that the relationship between genotype and "nose, lip and eye shapes" on the one hand, and extraversion and IQ and criminality on the other, are fundamentally different.

And that difference has ethical content (implications?). Think for a minute: why do we hold someone responsible for their criminal behavior, but not for the texture of their hair? Hair texture is determined by our genes; we don't have any choice about it, and groups of people with a certain kind of hair just are the way they are. There is no ethical content to hair texture, no hope that things will be different someday. On the hereditarian view, IQ as a heritable trait is just the same, at maybe a slightly lower level of heritability. That's the way people are born, there is nothing you can do about it. And because everything is heritable, blunt hereditarianism leads to an obviously false view in which everything, including all of the innumerable behavioral differences among various groups of people– are just a reflection of the way people are born. Hair texture and complex behavior are both heritable, but the causation that underlies the heritability of hair texture is not like the heritability of behaviour, for which the human central nervous system, the greatest engine of anti-determinism ever designed by evolution, is interposed between genotype and phenotype.

So these distinctions are "ethical" not because scientists get to reject conclusions they don't like, but because complex self-determination is a crucial component of an ethical evaluation of behavior. It is why the universal heritability of human differences does not compel genetic determinism. My contention is that self-determination can and does co-exist with a considerable amount of behavioral heritability. Genes are correlated with the IQs of individuals, but they don't determine the IQs of individuals.  Groups differ in their gene frequencies, they differ in their behavior, but the gene differences don't determine the behavioral differences.

Cochran is infuriating because he doesn't feel the need to argue his case on the merits. He assumes that the facts are obvious to everyone, but only he has the intellectual courage to face them:

The real problem with this book is that, to Zimmer and many other people, genetics itself is the enemy. The facts, not the discipline, particularly in how they apply to humans. We now know that everything is heritable, to varying degrees  — and the more that life is determined or influenced by genetics, the less blank the slate, the less that can be accomplished by egalitarian social policies (or by aristocratic social policies, for that matter). The facts of genetics are caltrops on the road to a 'just' society. Zimmer is moderately fair-minded, usually mentioning both criticism of genetic claims and the response to that criticism — but he still gives the impression of wishing these claims had never been made and dislikes scientists who discovered unpleasant truths.

This is theoretical slop.  Notice the "determined or influenced by".  What's the difference exactly? Is height determined by genes or influenced by them? Is it surprising that the heights of many populations have increased by more than three inches in the last 100 years?  Intelligence: determined or influenced, and how does the Flynn effect fit in? Divorce: determined or influenced? Does the heritability of marital status mean that we should give up on social policies relevant to marriage?

It is not Carl Zimmer who lets his policy preferences color his view of science. It's Cochran, and the fact that his view of the world is one that motivates him to put the word just in scare quotes only makes it worse,



_- Steve